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Abstract 
The Japanese population has been aging at a rapidly increasing rate since the 1960s. This study 
examines the economic growth consequences that may occur in the future if corrective measures 
are not implemented soon. I  use a modified version of the Solow model to analyze the 
relationship between a negative population growth rate and economic performance. I incorporate 
into the Solow model the dependency ratio as a proxy for population structure to better 
understand the population dynamics. The results indicate that population decline hinders Japan’s 
economic development and will continue to affect future performance. A substantial and 
audacious effort from the Japanese government, private sector and society is urgently needed in 
order to overcome the challenge of rapid aging. 
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The objective of this thesis is to examine the impact of population decline on economic growth. 
The study is not only on past population dynamics and economic expansion, but also develops 
forecasts and predictions on the relation of demographic dynamics and Japan’s economic 
performance through a modified version of the Solow model, an economic model of long-run 
economic growth. 
This thesis is structured as follows: In the first part I provide an overall background on the 
macroeconomic environment and the changes in fertility rates. In the next section, I discuss the 
existing literature of the main drivers of the Japanese demographic anomaly since its origin.  
In the second part I explain the mechanics of the Solow model and describe the modifications 
made in order to incorporate the dependency ratio. I also review analytically the impact of a 
change in the dependency ratio on the model’s outcome. Lastly, I show the numerical forecasts 
from the model that provide a quantitative prediction of Japan’s economic performance up to the 
year 2050, with particular focus to the growth explained by demographic dynamics. 
 
1.0 Introduction: From Lost Decade to Lost Quarter Century 
The Japanese economy has not grown since the Asset Price Bubble burst in 1990. A widely held 
view is that Japan had not bounced back due to the lack of an effective economic policy. 
Hitotsubashi University professor Reiko Aoki in her essay titled “A Demographic Perspective on 
Japan’s ‘Lost Decades’” states that the economic stagnation of the Lost Decades is a symptom of 
problems brought on by demographic changes in Japan since the end of World War II, notably 
the population aging caused by low fertility and increased longevity (Aoki 2012). 
Aoki argues that institutions that had functioned well under a growing supply of labor in 
expanding markets, such as social security schemes, labor market practices, and the political 
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system, failed to adapt to the demographic transformation. In addition, the shifting age structure 
worked against badly needed economic adjustments, as resources continued to be directed 
toward the aging members of society. The burden of old age support has become the 
responsibility of the relatively young age cohorts, creating a situation that is very difficult for 
society to correct (Aoki 2012).  
 
1.1 The Gradual Decline of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
The foundations of Japan’s current economic and legal system were established immediately 
after World War II. In 1947, the year in which the revised constitution became effective, the total 
fertility rate (TFR) was 4.5, life expectancy was 50.1 years for men and 54.0 years for women, 
the median age of the population was 22 years (Aoki 2012). 
An economic boom associated with postwar reconstruction and the Korean War followed, along 
with a brief surge in fertility paralleling the Western baby boom.  However after this short baby 
boom period, 1947-1949, Japan’s fertility level dropped with unprecedented rapidity (Ogawa 
2003). Over the ten-year period of 1947-1957, the total rate declined more than 50% from 4.54 
to 2.04 children per woman. Additionally, a ten-year plan to double the national income, 
implemented in 1960, achieved its target in six years, creating changes in childbearing 
preferences (Aoki 2012, Ogawa 2003). Although Japan's TFR remained around the replacement 
level from the mid-1950s to the 1970s, the first oil crisis of 1973, which triggered restructuring 
of the Japanese economy, contributed to resumption in the declining trend of fertility (Ogawa 
2003).  
The economic downturn began in 1989, when the Bank of Japan, fearing inflation and 
overheated asset markets, raised its interest rate in a series of steps from 2.5 percent to 6.0 
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percent by the summer of 1990. The Nikkei average stock price index fell from over 30,000 to 
below 20,000 by 1995. The unemployment rate increased from 2.1 percent in 1990 to 3.2 percent 
by 1995 (Aoki 2012). The bubble had burst. The Bank of Japan then began to cut the interest rate 
until it reached 0.3 percent in 2001, but the Nikkei average remained below 20,000 and 
unemployment reached 5 percent (Aoki 2012).  
The year 1990 was also a demographic landmark. By then, life expectancy had risen to 75.9 
years for men and to 81.9 for women; the median age of the population was 37 (Aoki 2012). It 
became evident during 1990 that the TFR for the previous year had dropped to 1.57 – a fact now 
referred to as the “1.57 shock”. The number was significant because it was lower than the 1966 
TFR of 1.58. According to the Chinese zodiac, 1966 was the “Year of the Fire Horse” (Hinoe-
Uma); year in which parents prefer not to have a child. That fertility could be so low in a non-
Hinoe-Uma year became a source of public concern, calling wide attention to the fertility 
situation (Aoki 2012). 
In response, the government introduced various prenatal policies. However the TFR continued to 
decline. In 2010, the TFR was 1.39 – less than one-third that of the baby-boom period (Aoki 
2012, Ogawa 2003), life expectancy had continued to rise through the Lost Decades, reaching 
79.7 years for men and 86.4 years for women. The median age had risen to 47 (Aoki 2012).  
 
1.2 Human Capital and the Labor Market 
With few natural resources, Japan’s people are its greatest resource. There has always been a 
strong emphasis on investment in human capital. Education is given a high priority within the 
family, and labor practices have promoted firm-specific on-the job training. The expectation of 
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“lifetime employment,” at least as an ideal, meant that firms could recoup their investment over 
their employees’ working lives (Aoki 2012). 
This combination of labor practices made Japanese firms highly competitive in the world market 
of manufactured goods. However, this system relied on population growth and became 
unfeasible when that growth ceased (Aoki 2012). In its place, firms have turned increasingly to 
“non-regular workers”, those on short-term contracts. Non-regular workers are 
disproportionately young and their numbers have risen significantly in the past two decades 
(Aoki 2012). Since older workers often have lifetime employment and job security, the young 
bear most of the adjustment costs.  Table 1 shows employment by status and the different types 




The shift in hiring practices accelerated after the asset bubble burst in 1990. Firms began firing 
middle-age workers before the mandatory retirement age, and, instead of hiring thousands of 
college graduates a year, they stopped hiring them altogether. For almost a decade and a half 
after the collapse, the labor market for graduating college students had been in an “ice age” 
Table 1 
Employment by status 
 
 
Source: Jones and Urasawa, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
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(Ogura and Kadoda 2008). Even when the business eventually turned better, and firms needed 
more workers, they did not resume hiring regular employees for a while, instead, they hired part-
time workers (Ogura and Kadoda 2008). 
Under this new labor market scheme, workers accumulate fewer skills and have poorer wage 
prospects, whether in their current job or in the outside labor market. They are forced to delay 
marriage and to start a family, putting further downward pressure on the fertility rate and 
hastening population aging (Aoki 2012, Ogura and Kadoda 2008). 
 
1.3 Childless Blues: How Labor Market Practices Impacted TFR 
To further understand the impact that the new employment status among the young has had on 
the TFR, we must look at a study conducted by Japanese economists Seritsu Ogura and Tamotsu 
Kadoda. In their paper titled: “Effects of Public Policies and Labor Market on the Fertility of 
Japanese Women: Analyses of Municipal Data”, Ogura and Kadoda identify three major events 
that contributed to the decline in the TFR: the bubble economy providing opportunities to 
women in the labor force, large corporations moving away from their traditional personnel 
management model, and the abandonment of struggling young men in the government’s pro-
fertility policies (Ogura and Kadoda 2008). 
The bubble economy contributed significantly to the initial decline in fertility by inducing 
behavioral changes in younger women, as the unprecedented economic boom for the first time 
had opened career opportunities in major corporations for women graduating from colleges 
(Ogura and Kadoda 2008). Figure 1 shows how the female participation rate in the labor force 
















































































































According to Ogura and Kadoda, the reduced preference for children due to an increase in 
female participation in the labor market was the dominant factor during the 1985 - 1989 period, 
and again in the 1995 - 1999 period. But after the year 2000, this factor seemed to have lost some 
of its steam. As a result, for the first time during the last twenty years, since year 2000, more 
than half of the decline in the TFR can be attributed to the changes in economic factors, 
particularly labor market factors. In recent years the most important factor in the decline was the 
labor market uncertainty of young men (Ogura and Kadoda 2008).  
In the following section I will discuss the key drivers that led the country to the demographic 
conundrum it finds itself in today. 
 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan 
 9 
2.0 How Did We Get Here? Drivers of Population Anomaly 
The spectacular story of the decline in Japan's population growth continues with that 
regularity in the extraordinary which has characterized the country over the past hundred 
years. Death rates are low, but so are the birth rates. Growth continues slowly, but only 
because the age structure is inherited from a period when birth rates were higher. […] Quiet 
inquiries are already being made concerning the pursuit and the timing of policies to 
increase birth rates. 
- Irene B. Taeuber 1962 
 
The opening quote was extracted from Irene Taeuber’s essay titled “Japan’s Population: Miracle, 
Model or Case Study”, published in Foreign Affairs magazine in July of 1962. The truth is this 
same quote can very well appear in a 2015 copy of the publication as the situation has little 
changed. To understand how Japan entered such a dire demographic situation, we must examine 
the drivers behind the population anomaly.  Since this thesis consists of numerous demographic 
terms, I reason it is easier for the reader to follow the statements and results, which will be 
presented later on, if I describe the demographic drivers in more detail.  
Japan currently enjoys the lowest infant mortality rates and the longest life expectancy in the 
world. Figure 2 illustrates a rough breakdown of Japan’s demographic transition, and shows 
three periods: a period of high fertility and high mortality rates (up to 1870), a period of high 
fertility rates but low mortality rates (1870–1960), and a period of low fertility and low mortality 
rates (1960–present). Until the beginning of the Meiji Era (around 1870), fertility and mortality 
rates were both significantly higher. Then the mortality rate started to decline, and Japan entered 
a period of high fertility and low mortality. From around 1920, the fertility rate also started to 
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decline slowly and the sharp decline after World War II marked a new demographic transition. 
Currently, Japan is in a period of low fertility and low mortality and both have settled at low 
levels. Japan’s demographic transition has taken nearly the same path as Western countries, but 



















Source: 1870 – 1920 Yoichi Okazaki (1995), 1920 – 1997 “Population Survey Report,” Statistics and 
Information Department, Cabinet Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Welfare, World Bank World 
Development Indicators  
 
 
2.1 Prewar Natality Gap 
During Japan’s period of demographic transition at the turn of the twentieth century, the age of 
first marriage and marital fertility were both determined by the joint interaction of child 
employability and infant mortality. A high level of infant mortality increased the pressure for 
early marriage and a low rate permitted late matrimony (Mosk 1977). There were strong 
incentives for parents’ delaying the marriage of their daughters in that they could keep them on 
Figure 2 


















their own farms, as a labor source, or send them to a factory on a fixed contract by which they 
could be a source of family sustenance. As a couple advanced into their middle forties or so and 
grew progressively less healthy, the necessity of having a son reach maturity became especially 
critical since the couple could depend on him for assistance. When infant mortality rates were 
high, women had to commence bearing children at a relatively young age in order to ensure that 
a son would survive and mature by the time they would become his dependents (Mosk 1977). 
Child bearing was motivated by an economic incentive as well as by a concern for wellbeing at 
later stages of life.   
As long as there were no restrictions of the parents’ ability to use children as labor, having 
children was encouraged as long as purely economic conditions lent themselves to substantial 
child employment. There came however a restriction in the form of the government’s program of 
compulsory education. First made compulsory for four years in 1886, the length of required 
schooling was stepped up to six years in 1907. Surely, by the first decade of the twentieth 
century compulsory education had made sweeping gains everywhere. Its gains, according to 
Mosk, cut the desired number of births substantially among most segments of the Japanese 
population. Hence a gap emerged as the desired natality became lower than the actual. Prewar 
trends are explicable in terms of a closing of this gap. However as fertility began its slow 
descent, variables such as urbanization, industrialization, and declining infant mortality may 
have encouraged further declines in the desired number of births, thus widening the gap. Lastly, 
Mosk suggests that greatest emphasis should be placed upon compulsory education, as this 
program narrowed (yet didn't close) the gap by bringing down actual natality (Mosk1977).  
The gap between desired and actual natality described by Mosk is unlikely to explain the entire 
decline across the period of 1920 – 1960. However the existence of this gap would serve as a 
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catalyst for the socio-economic factors explained in the following paragraphs, contributing to the 
acceleration of Japan’s population decline. In addition to the gradual changes in the prewar era, a 
number of dramatic socio-economic changes were concentrated in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II, and these undoubtedly played a part in the fertility decline. 
2.2 Postwar Socio-economic Determinants 
2.2.1 Children no Longer Commitment Goods 
Ronald Freedman points out the degree to which old-age security may have influenced the 
falling Japanese birth rate. He states that Japanese data provide a striking illustration of the close 
relation between norms about dependence on adult children and the course of fertility. Between 
1950 and 1961 the Japanese birth rate fell spectacularly from 28 to 17 per 1000. In the same 
period the biennial sample surveys by the Mainichi press posed to a representative cross-section 
of the population the question: "Do you expect to depend on your children in your old age?" In 
1950 a majority, more than 55 percent, answered "definitely yes." The proportion giving this 
answer declined steadily in five succeeding surveys, reaching 27 percent by 1961 (Freedman 
1968). It was certainty rare to find that public opinion on a matter this vital changed so steadily 
and so rapidly.  
Leibenstein suggested that a change in norms about dependence of parents on adult children 
between 1950 and 1960 was an important factor. This economist offers an analysis based on a 
simple and unique theory of consumer behavior that differs from conventional theory in that not 
all goods are subject to diminishing marginal utility from the first unit. He posits the existence of 
goods that are subject to increasing marginal utility up to some level and to normal diminishing 
marginal utility beyond that level. Among these increasing marginal utility (IMU) goods are 
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what he calls “commitment goods”. For commitment goods, the marginal utility of each unit 
increases until the critical level (target) is reached (Leibenstein 1975). Beyond that point 
diminishing marginal utility sets in. The person is "committed" to a certain minimum 
expenditure until he/she reaches the target. By and large status maintenance expenditures are 
commitment goods in the sense indicated. Needless to say, it is not the physical nature of the 
goods that makes them commitment goods, but rather the way people feel about them and about 
status (Leibenstein 1975). 
An important type of commitment, Leibenstein argues, is the provision for old age security. This 
is frequently looked upon as one of the utilities for children, but for higher income groups it 
could be viewed as a significant expense. Clearly, the amount of provision for old-age security 
depends on the life style one is used to and hence also the life style one wishes to live in during 
old age. Thus, this commitment component operates in the way an IMU good would operate.  
 
2.2.2 Industrialization 
The redistribution of population, that is, the migration from rural to urban settings, was related to 
the requirements of an industrializing society (Taeuber 1958). From 1920 through 1935 the 
populations of the prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, Kyoto, and Hyogo increased 
more rapidly than the populations of the less industrialized prefectures. As war preparations 
advanced and war began in China, population redistribution became more rapid. So great was the 
movement of people to the industrial areas that fourteen prefectures declined in total population 
between 1935 and 1940 (Taeuber 1958). The depopulation of the countryside became a reality, 
when only a decade earlier the pressure of excess people on the land had appeared to be a major 
political and economic problem (Taeuber 1958). 
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Economic development and the downward movement of fertility had been interrelated aspects of 
the modernization of Japan. These relations were apparent in the data of the registration 
compilations of the early twentieth century. They emerge in clear form in the data on fertility 
secured in the census of 1950. In that year the number of children ever born per 1000 women 
aged 45 and over increased with the dependence of the population on agriculture as major 
industry, that is, there was an increase in the birth rate in rural regions with predominant 
agricultural activity. The age-specific fertility of the women of 1925, 1930, and 1947 shows 
persistent associations between agriculture and fertility. The greater rates of childbearing in 
agricultural as compared with intermediate or industrial prefectures characterized not only all 
women in the reproductive ages but women at each age. Between 1925 and 1930 fertility moved 
downward for each age group of women within each group of prefectures in all industrial areas. 
By 1947 fertility had moved sharply downward in all areas for women who were aged 25 or less 
or 35 and over (Taeuber 1958).  
The rapidity of the decline in fertility was related to the extent of the economic and cultural 
changes that influenced individuals and families. Industrial employment and urban residence that 
left cultural values untouched had little influence on fertility. As industrialization and 
urbanization developed, they influenced increasing proportions of the population directly and 
indirectly. Economic inadequacy, cultural stability, intellectual stillness, and high fertility 
became an associated complex of life and values among ever more limited groups. The economic 
and cultural changes were not confined to geographic area, occupation, or social structure. It is in 
this sense that the experience of Japan suggests that declining fertility is a necessary correlate of 
industrialization and urbanization (Taeuber 1958). 
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2.2.3 Women with Higher Wages 
Hashimoto argues that wages and job opportunities for women played a key role in the postwar 
fertility decline. He states that the basic proposition in the economic theory of fertility is that 
observed changes and differentials in the demand for fertility and that resource constraints on 
households exert appreciable effects on fertility demand (Hashimoto 1974). Most economic 
models of fertility view children as primarily consumer durables (Becker 1960). In this 
conception, a flow of services emanates from the stock of children, and these services enter the 
parents’ utility function. Since parents must make outlays (food, clothing, housing, and, most 
importantly, their time) to obtain child services, children are not free goods but command a price. 
To be quite general, therefore demand for fertility is determined by the preferences of parents, 
the resources available to parents, and the cost of producing child services relative to the cost of 
other commodities (usually identified collectively as the standard of living) that also yield utility 
(Hashimoto 1974). 
In his hypothesis, Hashimoto claims that there is a substitution effect that works against child 
bearing once there’s an increase in the wife’s wage rate. Typically, the fertility rate has declined 
in countries experiencing sustained growth in real income. Since growth in real income is usually 
brought about by growth in real wages, this phenomenon may be interpreted as reflecting the 
dominance of substitution over income effects. An increase in real income would, other things 
being equal, increase the number of children per family unless the number of children was an 
“inferior good”. Assuming that child services are more time-intensive for mothers than the 
standard of living, an increase in the wife’s wage rate would raise the relative cost of child 
services, imparting a substitution effect away from them. Relying on income and wage rates 
alone, one may, therefore, interpret the decline in fertility accompanying growth in real income 
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as reflecting the dominance of the substitution effect of a rise in the wife’s wage rate over the 
combined income effects of increases in both spouses’ wage rates. 
Hashimoto’s cross-section analyses of 1960 data reveal that the economic theory of fertility, 
which emphasizes the effects of female education and earning power on fertility demand, 
provides a useful framework for analyzing fertility differentials in Japan. In particular, 
regressions of completed fertility and live birth rates in 1960 show that female education and 
earnings affect fertility negatively. Male education and earnings tend to have positive but less 
significant effects (Hashimoto 1974). Interestingly enough, on the basis of only sociological, 
demographic, or taste considerations, Hashimoto was not expecting to find female education 
more important than male education in explaining fertility differentials. Indeed, in Japan, 
because of male’s generally dominant role in household decisions, one would have expected to 
find male education to be at least as relevant as female education, if not more so, in explaining 
fertility differences. This surprising piece of evidence confirms Hashimoto’s proposition that 
wages and job opportunities for women played an important role in the postwar fertility decline. 
2.2.4 National Eugenics Law of 1948 
The rapid decline in Japanese fertility in the postwar decade coincided with abortion 
liberalization measures and the subsequent dissemination of information about other means of 
fertility control. As Hashimoto describes, it is tempting to explain the rapid decline in fertility as 
simply the result of a widespread resort to abortion. According to this view many births prior to 
abortion legalization were unwanted: the liberalization of birth-control policies simply 
eliminated this excess fertility. In other words, if abortion had not been legalized, fertility would 
not have declined even in the absence of abortion reform (Hashimoto 1974). 
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Since abortions and other fertility-control measures entail costs, both monetary and non-
monetary, the extent of use of these measures presumably was influenced by considerations of 
gains and costs. Abortion legalization and birth control, lead to increased use of control 
measures. On the demand side, the main determinant for fertility control is the demand for 
fertility. A fuller interpretation of the developments in Japan would be that the price of child 
services increased and demand for fertility declined, leading to an increased demand for fertility 
control, and that the increased availability of birth control measures and abortions facilitated the 
attainment of lower fertility (Hashimoto 1974). Put differently, even without the liberalization of 
abortion and other control policies, resort to illegal abortion and the use of contraceptives would 
have grown because of the increase in the price of child services. In fact, the availability of 
illegal abortions had been growing before 1948, and the Eugenics Law of 1948 was motivated by 
hygienics, not by intent of population control (Muramatsu 1967).  
In short, legalization and liberalization of control measures were not so much autonomous events 
as responses by authorities to increased demand for fertility control and the health hazards of 
illegal practices (Hashimoto 1974). Following this, however, due to the popularization of family 
planning through both the public and private sectors, contraception replaced induced abortion as 
the primary method of fertility control (JICA). 
2.2.5 Other Causes 
In their article on the postwar fertility decline Kozo Yamamura and Susan Hanley give evidence 
concerning several other possible causes: the desire of members of the postwar generation to 
enhance their standard of living, high social mobility after the war, and the group orientation of 
the Japanese (Yamamura & Hanley 1975). It should also be noted that infant mortality rates 
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continued to fall throughout the decade of the fifties. Finally, the number of years of compulsory 
education was stepped up to nine with the educational reforms of 1947. Thus it would be 
painting far too crude a picture simply to characterize the postwar decline as the narrowing of the 
gap generated in the Meiji era (Mosk 1977). 
The demographic anomalies discussed in this chapter resulted in a change in the structure of the 
population as illustrated in figure 2, where the oldest cohort of the population is also the fastest 




Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data 
2.3 The Development of the Dependency Ratio 
Modernization comes with a price. Japan's transformation into an advanced industrial nation has 
been accompanied by changes in intergenerational relations within the family that, while unique 
in certain respects, bear similarities to the historical experience of Western industrial nations 
(Ogawa & Retherford 1993). As the transformation from an agrarian society to an industrial 
Figure 3 









































































































society proceeds, the burden of caring for elderly parents tends to shift from adult children to the 
state, to businesses, unions, and other private sector organizations, and to the elderly themselves 
(Davis & Combs 1950), (Cowgill & Holmes1972), (Davis & van den Oever 1981), (Lee 1984). 
A more complex set of reasons has to do with the shift from a peasant-agrarian economy to an 
urban-industrial economy (Davis & Combs 1950); (Davis & van den Oever, 1981). 
Modernization causes a demographic transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and 
death rates, a shift that in turn causes a major increase in the dependency ratio, measured as 
follows: 
 





In this thesis the dependent population is defined as youngsters aged 0-14 years plus those above 
64. The working population is equal to the total population minus the dependent population, i.e., 
those in the 15-64 cohort. This calculation of the dependency ratio assumes that people work 
during the age of 15-64 and do not work while they are younger than 15 or older than 65. 
The increase in the total dependency ratio in Japan is due to the growth in the cohort of those 
above the age of 64. This portion of the dependency ratio is also referred to as the old-age 
dependency ratio. Figure 3 shows the steady increase of the total dependency ratio since the 










Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan 
 
3.0 The Theoretical Model 
Economic models represent a simplified description of reality (Ouliaris 2011). By adding and 
modifying economic parameters within the model, I can calculate the impact of the modifications 
and then make estimates about the future. The model I focus on is the neo classical growth model 
as presented by Robert Solow in 1966, with adaptations to the standard model in order to include 
population dynamics. 
 
3.1 The Solow Model 
The Solow model illustrates in a long run perspective how a country’s economic growth rate 
approaches its steady-state level. The steady-state is the level at which all the parameters in the 
model are in equilibrium (but not necessarily at optimum level). The building blocks of the 
Solow model are the equations for production and capital accumulation. This production 
Figure 4 










equation is denoted as a Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale. The basic inputs 
in this production function are capital (K) and labor (L) as is shown in equation (a) 
 
𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼    (a) 
 
The second key equation, capital accumulation (b), is determined by the amount of savings, 
depreciation and population growth. 
 
?̇? = 𝑠𝑌 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘      (b) 
 
The model demonstrates how far a country is from its steady state. A country that is far below its 
steady state will grow at a faster rate than a country which is closer to its steady-state- (Jones & 
Vollrath 2013). 
Later in his study, Solow added technology as an exogenous term into the production function to 
allow for long run growth in GDP per capita (Jones & Vollrath 2013). Solow found that this 
technology parameter could explain the continuous growth of economies. This added feature is 
an important distinction from the original Solow model (without technology parameter), as it 
allows countries at their steady-state to continue growing at a balanced pace, whereas in the 
original model countries do not grow at all once they reached the steady-state (Jones & Vollrath 
2013).  I do not show every step of the original Solow model here. For reference and further 




3.2 Analysis of the Solow Model 
I use the Solow model with its standard assumptions as described by David Weil in his textbook 
“Introduction to Economic Growth”. As part of the technical analysis we add the dependency 
ratio to the model and take the first derivative to observe how income per capita responds to a 
change in the dependency ratio. This is helpful to forecast and understand possible changes in 
economic growth in the future. 
For simplicity, I assume international migration is zero. This is realistic since data from the 
OECD show a declining trend in migrant inflow, in addition to Japan’s well-known strict 
immigration policies. 
I also presume: 
Y: total income, GDP 
y: income per capita 
𝑌
𝐿
=  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎  
A: technological progress 
K: capital stock 
α: share of capital in the production function α ∈ (0, 1) 
s: savings rate 
L: total population 
W: working population 
D: dependent population 






















3.3 The Modified Solow Model 
The idea of a modified Solow Model for population decline comes from Schramm and Eriksson, 
who tested the model for population decline in China and Sweden respectively (Schramm 2011, 
Eriksson 2007). 
One of the main assumptions of the Solow model is that the whole population (L) is working. I 
modify that assumption in the theoretical framework and use only the working age population 
(ages 15-64) in combination with the dependency ratio. This yields different results and allows 
for integration of the population age structure into the model. In the first part of the analysis 
capital stock is held constant; in the second part I include a dynamic capital stock into the model. 
 
3.3.1 Solow Model with Constant Capital Stock 
GDP per capita is modified as a combination of GDP per worker and the ratio of workers to total 
population as follows: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 =  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 ∗
𝑊
𝐿






















     (2) 
Combining equations (1) and (2): 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 =  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟 ∗  (
1
1+𝚫  
),      (3) 
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Δ being equal to 
𝐷
𝑊
. Using this rearrangement it is easy to observe what happens when the 
dependency ratio (Δ) increases, that is, when the dependent population (D) increases, the 
working population (W) decreases, or both. Mathematically we see that GDP per capita is 
negatively related to Δ. When the dependent portion of the population increases, GDP per capita 
decreases.  
I now analyze a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, considering that only a fraction of 
the population is working: 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝑊1−𝛼                              (4) 
 Since the Solow model defines GDP per capita as 𝑦 =
𝑌
𝐿
=  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎, I divide by L to get GDP 

















                    (5) 









)                   (6) 
Given that the analysis centers on how population dynamics influence population growth, it is 
important we use GDP per capita. GDP per capita yields the most noticeable results in terms of 
how it affects an economy. 
I now take the first derivative of equation (6) with respect to Δ to observe analytically what 














)      which is < 0.  (7) 





is positive, the last term −
1
(1+∆)2
 is negative. This shows analytically that in 
the standard Solow model the dependency ratio (Δ), and therefore the population age structure, 
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hold a negative relationship with GDP per capita. A higher dependency ratio leads to lower GDP 
per capita.  
The focus of the analysis now shifts to growth rates. I now take the logarithm of equation (4) and 
the first derivative with respect to time, resulting in equation (8): 
gY = gA + αgK + (1-α)gW                (8) 
One can observe in equation (8) that economic growth is composed by the growth rate of 
working population, slightly smoothed by 1-α, which is in turn influenced by the change of the 
dependency ratio and the total population growth. This equation allows us to identify the extent 
to which demographic change contributes to the GDP growth rate, as I will analyze in section 
3.4. 
I was able to observe the contribution of demographic dynamics on economic growth by holding 
capital stock and technological progress constant. What would happen if the capital stock is 
dynamic?  
 
3.3.2 Solow Model with Dynamic Capital Stock 
The assumption of a constant capital stock is now relaxed and capital stock is redefined as 
follows: 
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝑊𝑡
1−𝛼  Assuming that 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠 (
𝑊𝑡
𝐿𝑡
)                                    (9) 
Consequently, s is increasing if the proportion of workers to total population (
𝑊
𝐿
) is also 
increasing. I then calculate the growth rate of the capital stock gK and insert it into our total 
income (GDP) growth equation. 













− 1                                                     (10) 
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− 1] + (1 − 𝛼)𝑔𝑤                                                      (11) 
This equation will serve to calculate GDP growth rates and total GDP until 2050.  
 
3.4 Data and Neoclassical Growth Theory 
This section will focus on growth accounting with special attention to population dynamics. The 
GDP growth rate is decomposed into growth of capital stock and working population as 
discussed previously. 
Certain assumptions underlie the calculations: 
1. Current political climate does not change dramatically. 
2. Education is equally distributed among the population and is not part of the calculations. 
Focus is on population growth and dependency ratio 
3. The Cobb-Douglas production function holds constant returns to scale. 
4. The other parameters are held constant i.e. technological progress (A). 
5. Although the official retirement in Japan is at age 60, I maintain the assumption of a 
working age between 15 and 65. Firstly out of convenience since the data is separated in 
that range. Secondly, given the rapid aging of the Japanese society, along with the 
alarming national debt levels, Japan will have to make adjustments in the future and I 
expect the retirement age to increase. 
The values for α range between 0.36 and .77 depending on the computation method used by the 
researcher (see Guerriero 2012, Jones 2003, Bernanke and Gürkaynak 2002). In the model I set α 
at 0.36. The analysis begins by calculating the growth rate of the working population and then 
we use equation (8) with constant capital stock that yields the demographic contributors of 
growth rates of GDP from the chosen base year 2013 to 2050. 
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Following the description made by Schramm, the procedure for our calculations can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Calculate capital stock 𝐾𝑡 using equation (9) 
2. Calculate 𝑔𝑌 with growth equation (11) 
3. Calculate GDP, 𝑌𝑡+1 
4. Start again by calculating capital stock 𝐾𝑡+1 
This yields our forecasts of economic growth for Japan until 2050 (in 2013 US dollars). The 
entire data set is available in table A in the appendix. Using a dynamic savings rate yields 
negative GDP growth rates since the shrinking working population has a multiple effect in the 
model. 
I also conducted another forecast with a constant savings rate at 0.5. This could reflect reality as 
an uncertain pension system could be responsible for a high savings rate despite the fact that the 
working population is decreasing. Japan’s debt burden is growing and the transfer payments to 
retirees are likely to get out of control. Those forecasts are displayed in table B in the appendix. 
Since this thesis is about incorporating the dependency ratio into Japan’s economic growth, I 
include a non-linear regression analysis on the relation of the dependency ratio (∆) and GDP 
































Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data, author’s calculations 
 
The regression yields a polynomial function of 4th order as a result. This means that when 
applied in the Solow model, ∆ has a bigger impact on 𝑔𝑌 than overall expected. One possible 
explanation for the polynomial regression could be that ∆ has multiple effects on the model. 
Another research project would benefit from more data sets to verify those results. 
From the model we can state that Japan will see a short-lived increase in output per worker 
during the next few years, yet total output will fall as the working population continues to 
decrease. The results of my forecasts are graphed in figure 5. I acknowledge that the results 








Source: Federal Reserve Bank, author’s calculations 
 
What I can state from the model analysis is that an ageing Japan will have decelerating growth 
rates and the rapid and continuing ageing will hamper economic growth. In Japan the population 
over 65 years of age already represents one quarter of the total population and the model 
suggests this trend will continue expanding. Figure 6 shows that the ratio of workers per 
dependent person approaches 1 by 2060; this has further implications on the economic burden 

















































































































































































































































































































































Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan, author’s calculations 
 
4.0 Discussion: Upcoming challenges for Japan and the current attempt at revival 
A topic which has not been considered in this thesis is the unsustainability of Japan’s debt if the 
population follows the path projected by the model. Since the 1990s, Japan has pioneered several 
efforts in stimulus programs trying to revive the economy, while letting the tax revenue 
deteriorate. In addition, the accelerated aging of the population has increased the cost of social 
security and pension outlays. My data shows how the working population is projected to 
continue shrinking, this will not only mean that there will be fewer taxpayers, but the Japanese 
savings rate will also decrease, as an increasing number of pensioners start dipping into their 
savings, shrinking the pool of money available for government bond purchases and capital 
investment. The resulting scenario is unsustainable. The government must prioritize and carry 
out a fiscal restructuring immediately.  
Figure 6 
Total Dependency Ratio  
Historical and Forecast 
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If Japan wants a welfare scheme like Norway, then it must tax like Norway. To Japan’s 
misfortune, the most recent value added tax (VAT) hike from 5 percent to 8 percent in April of 
2014 sent the country into recession by the end of the year. Fiscal consolidation without shooting 
itself in the foot is a formidable challenge to keep an eye on.  
Another possible solution to the acute shortage in the working population projected by the model 
is one that is economically simple yet politically impossible: immigration. Bringing in foreign 
workers would increase the supply of labor in order to meet the demand, their income would be 
taxed thus increasing tax revenue, and most importantly, an injection of young workers into the 
labor force would kick start consumption and spending from the micro level, setting Japan closer 
to reigniting its economy. On the political front however, any reform that puts out the welcome 
mat for foreigners is doomed to fail passage in the National Diet, as anxieties about national 
identity and crime are strong within the constituency which, just like the population as a whole, 
has its fastest growing voter base in the 65+ year-old age cohort.  
This does not mean that efforts haven’t been made. In May 2012, Japan introduced a points 
system for highly-skilled foreign professionals using Australia’s system as a role model. Points 
were calculated according to factors like age, previous work experience, academic qualifications, 
annual wage and passing the Japanese Language Proficiency Test. For people scoring above 70 
points, immigration requirements were relaxed. The result was an utter failure. The number of 
highly skilled foreign workers attracted by the policy amounted to merely one quarter of the 
planned 2000 per year. The government insists on engineering ways to attract high-skilled labor, 
yet based on the projections of the model, labor at all levels of qualification will be required from 
here to 2050. The change in the age structure will create opportunities in sectors like senior care, 
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healthcare and information technology. Workers at all levels of skill will most certainly be 
required.  
However, not all labor solutions come from abroad. Japan has a powerful asset that is regrettably 
not fully utilized in the form of an educated female population. The data show that female 
participation rates increased at its most rapid pace in the years before the Asset Price Bubble of 
1990 although never reaching parity with the rates for men (figure 1). Since then the rates seem 
to have reached a plateau. Kathy Matsui, the mind behind Womenomics, argues that if the labor 
force participation of women reaches that of men, GDP would increase by nearly 13 percent 
(Matsui 2014). This gender gap is a societal phenomenon that can only be tackled if private 
sector, government and society all work together. For example, the current tax regime 
discourages married women for working full time; this is something the government could easily 
address to incentivize female labor force participation rates. In the corporate world, Matsui 
proposes to convince management about the business case for diversity. By maximizing the 
talent pool of an organization, the bottom-line will receive the benefits. When it comes to 
society, Japan historically has always had a series of social norms that argue against women fully 
participating in the work place, especially after starting a family. Matsui states that it is important 
to start educating at home and at schools about why diversity is important for the Japanese 
society. 
The administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduced an economic revival plan 
commonly referred to as Abenomics in early 2013. The three-arrow strategy includes aggressive 
monetary easing, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms. The first two arrows (monetary easing 
and fiscal stimulus) were the first to be launched and generated optimism after significant 
success in greater consumer confidence and gains in financial markets. However, Abenomics’ 
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initial success has diminished and risk factors have become more apparent. The third arrow 
(structural reforms) was presented in the summer of 2014. Currently this third arrow is stalled in 
the National Diet and the chances of approval weaken with every passing day. With a shrinking 
population, unless there is a highly unlikely productivity transformation, Japan’s growth rate is 
expected to fall, as demonstrated in this thesis. Structural reforms are badly needed for 
sustainable growth and for Japan to break out of the vicious cycle the country has entered since 
the Asset Price Bubble burst in 1990. For this reason I believe the third arrow of Abenomics is 
the most important of all. Without it the monetary stimulus and fiscal incentives of the first and 
second arrows will prove ineffective and have ephemeral success. Furthermore, even though the 
structural reforms of the third arrow do include measures addressing the decline of the 
population, these are insufficient and lack the magnitude to have a considerable impact. A 
monetary solution alone cannot solve a structural issue. Immigration and increased labor force 
participation are not the only answer, but they are part of a solution to get the economy growing 
on a sustainable path. 
5.0 Conclusion 
Japan has been suffering an ongoing decline in its population since the 1960s, an issue that has 
accelerated since the Asset Price Bubble crash of 1990 and has now cost the country a quarter of 
a century of lost growth. Japan benefitted from a lower dependency ratio during the fast 
industrialization period in the 1970s, but the accelerated aging of the population resulted in an 
increasing dependency ratio. According to my forecasts applying the modified Solow model, 
Japan must expect a negative impact on economic growth until 2050 because of population 
dynamics. A set of interesting parameters to be added in future research include tax rates, 
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healthcare expenditures and especially monetary base expansion, given the several rounds of 
quantitative easing the Bank of Japan has implemented since the late 1990s.  
Adjustments to the calculation of the dependency ratio are needed since people in Japan are 
entering the workforce at a later age and the retirement age would also vary. These changes have 
implications on the population age structure and on the models used. The calculations made here 
are to be understood as a net effect, where the relevance lies in the growth rates and not so much 
in the level variables. Many other factors, which are main contributors to Japan’s economic 
growth have not been considered. However, from a population perspective, my data show that 
Japan stopped benefitting from population dynamics long ago and a declining working 
population is at the core of Japan’s negative to meager growth in recent decades. The issue of 
population decline is ever more relevant as this phenomenon is present across the majority of 
developed nations. What makes Japan stand out is that population decline is happening at a much 
faster rate. It will be interesting and intriguing to see how Japan will handle this key issue. 
The land of the rising sun has seen its sun grow old for too long. Bold actions by the government 
and society need to take place immediately. The same audacity that made this nation rise from 
the devastation of the Second World War, and that later allowed it to become the first non-
Western nation to join the exclusive club of the “Developed”, is urgently needed. This time, the 
fight is against a natural phenomenon. And although Japan has marvelously engineered solutions 
to its ever present natural disaster threats of tsunamis and earthquakes, a solution for its 
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Exogenous Variables
A 1 technology parameter
a 0.36 productivity of capital
s 0.25 saving rate
d 0.15 depreciation rate
Year k y W gW Δ %Dy (δ+n)k Δk
2013 239390.56 6184206.958 79144167 -0.01561 0.58556 32171.79 3108453
2014 3347844.01 15724103.69 77986667 -0.01463 0.596771 1.542622 453213.7 7518802
2015 10866646.23 23008820.34 76846095 -0.01463 0.651574 0.463283 1471070 10182258
2016 21048904.09 28753875.91 76015000 -0.01082 0.665106 0.249689 2929690 11572404
2017 32621307.92 33242145.45 75285000 -0.0096 0.675965 0.156093 4579922 12157908
2018 44779215.74 36857119.61 74628000 -0.00873 0.684703 0.108747 6326101 12209004
2019 56988220.15 39854917.69 74059000 -0.00762 0.690949 0.081336 8113727 11904497
2020 68892717.4 42288724.69 73459000 -0.0081 0.697409 0.061067 9775763 11461456
2021 80354173.42 44367124.79 72920000 -0.00734 0.702016 0.049148 11463533 10799268
2022 91153441.46 46182701.84 72465000 -0.00624 0.704202 0.040922 13104245 10049814
2023 101203255.6 47680018.53 71980000 -0.00669 0.706669 0.032422 14503146 9399774
2024 110603030 48885816.49 71432000 -0.00761 0.71027 0.025289 15748409 8761201
2025 119364230.6 49934948.4 70911000 -0.00729 0.71288 0.021461 17034034 7991729
2026 127355960 50836924.79 70417000 -0.00697 0.714515 0.018063 18216171 7252818
2027 134608777.6 51523485.83 69870000 -0.00777 0.717146 0.013505 19145674 6667865
2028 141276642.4 52017202.87 69261000 -0.00872 0.721041 0.009582 19960103 6101682
2029 147378324.5 52337157.1 68597000 -0.00959 0.726081 0.006151 20693844 5527729
2030 152906053.2 52398651.47 67807000 -0.01152 0.734157 0.001175 21174960 5082904
2031 157988956.9 52751164.44 67304000 -0.00742 0.734681 0.006728 22526364 3877986
2032 161866942.9 52444762.68 66411000 -0.01327 0.745133 -0.00581 22132366 4145013
2033 166011955.4 52123787.57 65494000 -0.01381 0.756237 -0.00612 22609508 3500724
2034 169512679.1 51645610.97 64523000 -0.01483 0.768873 -0.00917 22913743 2952840
2035 172465519.5 51045958.63 63513000 -0.01565 0.782722 -0.01161 23170168 2390227
2036 174855746.1 50295448.92 62440000 -0.01689 0.798591 -0.0147 23274318 1905600
2037 176761346.5 49417127.79 61312000 -0.01807 0.816398 -0.01746 23320948 1413145
2038 178174491.7 48429312.61 60141000 -0.0191 0.835969 -0.01999 23323213 908800.5
2039 179083292.2 47428713.26 58998000 -0.01901 0.855215 -0.02066 23458955 260349.2
2040 179343641.4 46487881.87 57946000 -0.01783 0.872071 -0.01984 23703649 -468054
2041 178875586.9 45579013.07 56968000 -0.01688 0.886937 -0.01955 23812315 -1040367
2042 177835219.6 44719259.66 56064000 -0.01587 0.899633 -0.01886 23853294 -1517749
2043 176317470.5 43867444.87 55196000 -0.01548 0.91137 -0.01905 23717820 -1812153
2044 174505317.1 43070513.28 54387000 -0.01466 0.921268 -0.01817 23618098 -2113823
2045 172391494 42291433.27 53610000 -0.01429 0.930237 -0.01809 23395853 -2282748
2046 170108745.5 41571529.33 52888000 -0.01347 0.937377 -0.01702 23225349 -2472888
2047 167635857.2 40851019.14 52177000 -0.01344 0.944267 -0.01733 22891765 -2499863
2048 165135994.4 40126273.3 51463000 -0.01368 0.951421 -0.01774 22510647 -2481467
2049 162654527.4 39420040.31 50761000 -0.01364 0.958295 -0.0176 22179430 -2503561
2050 160150966.7 38753208.45 50091000 -0.0132 0.964125 -0.01692 21908795 -2566060
Table A: Forecasts according to the Solow Model with Constant Capital Stock. 
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, author’s calculations 
 
 







Year W/L Dynam s k y W gW gk gy %Dy (δ+n)k Δk Δ
2013 0.621026 0.1552565 239390.6 24238122 79144167 -0.01561 5.359301 2.919358 32171.79 942681.3 0.58556
2014 0.613069 0.1532672 1182072 24238122 77986667 -0.01463 1.23795 1.436302 0.086512 160022.7 1518921 0.596771
2015 0.605483 0.1513708 2700993 26334998 76846095 -0.01463 0.290224 1.09512 0.108981 365646.4 1770283 0.651574
2016 0.600563 0.1501406 4471276 29205012 76015000 -0.01082 -0.07956 0.964438 0.107312 622334.3 1869537 0.665106
2017 0.596671 0.1491678 6340813 32339070 75285000 -0.0096 -0.27323 0.89549 0.080425 890228.8 1877441 0.675965
2018 0.593577 0.1483941 8218255 34939952 74628000 -0.00873 -0.391 0.853654 0.062089 1161019 1825699 0.684703
2019 0.591384 0.147846 10043953 37109328 74059000 -0.00762 -0.46897 0.826292 0.049958 1430013 1737472 0.690949
2020 0.589133 0.1472833 11781425 38963244 73459000 -0.0081 -0.52482 0.805879 0.037879 1671765 1639642 0.697409
2021 0.587539 0.1468846 13421067 40439148 72920000 -0.00734 -0.56608 0.791517 0.032002 1914684 1518124 0.702016
2022 0.586785 0.1466962 14939191 41733280 72465000 -0.00624 -0.59698 0.781095 0.027835 2147662 1393988 0.704202
2023 0.585937 0.1464842 16333179 42894932 71980000 -0.00669 -0.62152 0.771969 0.021461 2340661 1290093 0.706669
2024 0.584703 0.1461758 17623271 43815516 71432000 -0.00761 -0.64201 0.764004 0.01599 2509321 1188597 0.71027
2025 0.583812 0.1459531 18811869 44516138 70911000 -0.00729 -0.65878 0.758171 0.014073 2684573 1070710 0.71288
2026 0.583255 0.1458138 19882579 45142592 70417000 -0.00697 -0.67244 0.753463 0.011888 2843875 961402 0.714515
2027 0.582362 0.1455904 20843981 45679260 69870000 -0.00777 -0.68426 0.748695 0.007783 2964681 874812.8 0.717146
2028 0.581044 0.1452609 21718793 46034772 69261000 -0.00872 -0.69487 0.744269 0.004408 3068514 788989.4 0.721041
2029 0.579347 0.1448367 22507783 46237672 68597000 -0.00959 -0.70446 0.74026 0.001456 3160387 700155.4 0.726081
2030 0.576649 0.1441622 23207938 46305004 67807000 -0.01152 -0.71367 0.735707 -0.00367 3213916 625128.6 0.734157
2031 0.576475 0.1441187 23833067 46135230 67304000 -0.00742 -0.71993 0.736079 0.004727 3398164 453166.2 0.734681
2032 0.573022 0.1432556 24286233 46353295 66411000 -0.01327 -0.72728 0.729687 -0.0114 3320701 480983.1 0.745133
2033 0.569399 0.1423498 24767216 45824990 65494000 -0.01381 -0.73476 0.72665 -0.00989 3373098 372622.7 0.756237
2034 0.565332 0.1413329 25139839 45371801 64523000 -0.01483 -0.74164 0.723522 -0.01308 3398258 277791 0.768873
2035 0.56094 0.140235 25417630 44778332 63513000 -0.01565 -0.748 0.720702 -0.01546 3414774 181030.2 0.782722
2036 0.555991 0.1389977 25598660 44086221 62440000 -0.01689 -0.75405 0.717729 -0.01876 3407331 94768.12 0.798591
2037 0.55054 0.137635 25693428 43259038 61312000 -0.01807 -0.75986 0.71489 -0.02161 3389854 7177.744 0.816398
2038 0.544672 0.1361679 25700606 42324350 60141000 -0.0191 -0.76537 0.712243 -0.02421 3364234 -81371.7 0.835969
2039 0.539021 0.1347552 25619234 41299887 58998000 -0.01901 -0.77017 0.710574 -0.02452 3355983 -185776 0.855215
2040 0.534168 0.133542 25433458 40287209 57946000 -0.01783 -0.7738 0.71002 -0.02323 3361512 -293649 0.872071
2041 0.52996 0.1324899 25139809 39351383 56968000 -0.01688 -0.77636 0.70971 -0.0229 3346667 -373358 0.886937
2042 0.526418 0.1316044 24766451 38450253 56064000 -0.01587 -0.778 0.709765 -0.02205 3321960 -434515 0.899633
2043 0.523185 0.1307962 24331937 37602393 55196000 -0.01548 -0.77907 0.709628 -0.02234 3273076 -467804 0.91137
2044 0.52049 0.1301224 23864132 36762171 54387000 -0.01466 -0.77955 0.709982 -0.02117 3229847 -498933 0.921268
2045 0.518071 0.1295178 23365200 35983954 53610000 -0.01429 -0.77963 0.710192 -0.02112 3170973 -510666 0.930237
2046 0.516162 0.1290404 22854534 35223824 52888000 -0.01347 -0.77923 0.710856 -0.01974 3120384 -523133 0.937377
2047 0.514333 0.1285832 22331401 34528526 52177000 -0.01344 -0.77866 0.711079 -0.02021 3049498 -514121 0.944267
2048 0.512447 0.1281117 21817279 33830679 51463000 -0.01368 -0.77812 0.711118 -0.02064 2974040 -500250 0.951421
2049 0.510648 0.1276621 21317029 33132483 50761000 -0.01364 -0.77756 0.711349 -0.02031 2906772 -492094 0.958295
2050 0.509132 0.1272831 20824935 32459468 50091000 -0.0132 -0.77678 0.71191 -0.01937 2848870 -488648 0.964125
Table B: Forecasts according to the Solow Model with Dynamic Capital Stock. 
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, author’s calculations 
 
 
